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FEDERAL PROCEDURE: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO
THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION OF PETITIONS
FOR THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of applications for writs of habeas corpus and
motions for relief pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. §
2255, a substitute proceeding for federal prisoners, has created a
serious problem in the federal courts. The purpose of this note is to
suggest possible solutions to the problem.
The classic remedy for a person who alleges that he is illegally
detained is to petition a court of competent jurisdiction for a writ
of habeas corpus. On issuance of the writ the custodian is ordered
to produce the body before the court. Following a determination of
the question of illegal detention the custodian is directed to release
or recommit the prisoner or a new trial may be ordered.'
The origin of the writ of habeas corpus is lost in history.' The
writ, however, was firmly recognized as a part of the common law
of England3 and the United States Constitution guarantees that the
privilege of resort to the writ shall not be suspended unless rebel-
lion, invasion or public safety so requires., Within the United States,
jurisdiction to issue the writ was conferred upon the federal courts
by the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided that the writ could
issue from a federal court only where the prisoner was in federal
custody." Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress extended jurisdiction to the federal courts to grant the
writ' "in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
1 See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAl. COURTS 177-186 (1963).
2 Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1949);
WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1 at 178. However, Glass, Historical Aspects of
Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHN'S REv. 55 (1935), argues that the origins of the
writ may be found in Roman law.
3 Glass, supra note 2 at 57.
4 U.S. CONST. art I § 9.
5 Twardowski, Habeas Corpus, 9 VI.. L. REv. 168 (1963).
6 "In 1867, Congress was anticipating resistance to its Reconstruction measures and
planning the implementation of the post-war constitutional Amendments. Debated
and enacted at the very peak of the Radical Republicans' power, ... the measure
that became the Act of 1867 seems plainly to have been designed to furnish a
method additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of state
court decisions for the vindication of the new constitutional guarantees.... [A]
remedy almost in the nature of a removal from the state to the federal courts of
the state prisoners' constitutional contentions seems to have been envisaged." Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415 (1963).
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liberty in violation of the constitution or of any treaty or law of the
United States."' The substantive scope of the writ has not changed
since 1867.8 It was at first held that the writ would issue only when
the state court lacked jurisdiction. Subsequently, however, the writ
was held to issue when the state court convicted the prisoner in
violation of his constitutional rights.' The writ's marked effect on
the development of the common law and its use in modern times
amply justify its designation as the "Great Writ.""0 Its protection is
a major limit on arbitrary government and its existence is a hallmark
of a free people.
II. COMPARISON OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND TITLE
28 U.S.C. § 2255 PROCEEDINGS
Today the habeas corpus provisions governing the federal courts
are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-54. In 1948, for the prisoner "in
custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress,"
28 U.S.C. § 2255 provided a substitute remedy. Basically there are
only three differences between § 2255 and habeas corpus proceedings:
(1) under § 2255 the prisoner need not be called before the bench
if it can be disposed of on the record while the very nature of the
writ of habeas corpus requires a production of the body;"' (2) under
§ 2255 the petition is filed in the jurisdiction wherein the sentence
was passed while under habeas corpus the petition is filed at the
place of incarceration; and (3) § 2255 was designed to supersede
the basic habeas corpus remedy to the extent that it was an adequate
vehicle to protect the rights previously protected by habeas corpus.
Section 2255 provides that a federal prisoner shall not be given
relief by a writ of habeas corpus unless it first appears that he has
made a motion under § 2255 or that it appears that § 2255 provides
an inadequate remedy. 2
7 WIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1 at 178. The appendix to Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at
441-43, contains the Judiciary Act of 1867 verbatim.
8 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1 at 178.
9 Twardowski, supra note 5 at 169.
10 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 95 (1807); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 399.
1 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1948); WnrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 788
(1963). "An essential element of the remedy by habeas corpus is the power to
compel the production of the body of the prisoner before the judge. It is this
very feature which .. .give[s) the name to the writ. And while in certain cases
courts have proceeded, generally by agreement of those concerned, without the
actual production of the prisoner, this has always been because such production
would be inconvenient, and the case was so shaped that the court was assured
that its order would be effective in the absence of the prisoner." Nebraska Chil-
dren's Home Soc. v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 767, 78 N.W. 267, 269 (1899).
22 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948): "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this
section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has
denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
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The impetus for the passage of § 2255 was that the courts in
locales which housed federal prisons were being deluged by a con-
stant stream of habeas petitions. In many cases the evidence neces-
sary for the required hearings was almost inaccessible to the court.
Thus § 2255 provided a remedy similar to habeas corpus. As was
pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case
of United States v. Hayman,3 § 2255 was passed at the insistence of
the Judicial Conference to meet the practical difficulties that had
arisen in the administration of the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
federal courts. It was not intended to impinge upon a prisoner's
right of collateral attack upon the conviction. Rather, the purpose
was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hear-
ings by providing the same rights in a more convenient forum. 4
III. PROLIFERATION
The problem of proliferation of the writ of habeas corpus may be
divided into three categories: (A) the increase of the number of
writs filed because of the expansion of many portions of the Bill of
Rights to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; (B) the increase of the number of writs
filed because of the change in procedural rules which were in the
past used as a method to avoid hearing habeas petitions; and (C)
the large number of successive writs which are filed by a single
prisoner due to the fact that the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to habeas proceedings.
A. Expanded Substantive Basis for Allowance of the Writ
The general approach which the Supreme Court of the United
States has taken with respect to the substantive content of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was stated by Justice
Moody in Twining v. New Jersey.5
[Ilt is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the
first eight Amendments against national action may also be safe-
guarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a
denial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not because those
rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because
they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception
of due process of law. Few phrases of the law are so elusive of
exact apprehension as this. Doubtless the difficulties of ascertaining
its connotation have been increased in American jurisprudence,
where it has been embodied in constitutions and put to new uses
as a limit on legislative power. This court has always declined to
13 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
14 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502 (1954); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Martin v. United
States; 273 F.2d 775 (10 Cir. 1960).
35 211 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1908).
19651
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW o
give a comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred that its
full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of in-
clusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they
arise.
Although this approach has been forcefully attacked by minority
members of the Court, it is still today the governing approach for
a determination of what is meant by due process of law." The lack
of precision engendered by this approach is evident from the holding
in Twining. It was there held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was not such a fundamental right as to be
incorporated into the phrase, "due process." This holding was over-
ruled in 1964 by Malloy v. Hogan." The Supreme Court in 1963
once more broadened the scope of due process by holding the right
to counsel in all felony cases, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment, applicable to the states. 8 In 1961 the federal exclusionary rule
pertaining to the use of illegally seized evidence was held, in Mapp
v. Ohio," to apply to the states.
There is also considerable question whether these holdings are to
be applied retroactively so as to allow a prisoner who was convicted
in violation of these rights prior to the decisions mentioned above,
to collaterally attack the convictions by means of a writ of habeas
corpus. As the question was stated by one federal district court
judge: "Until the Supreme Court itself clarifies the point, it is im-
possible for any other court or judge to be certain whether and to
what extent the Supreme Court intended the decision in Mapp v.
Ohio to be retrospective."2 Nevertheless, whether applied retroac-
tively or not, there are now more numerous grounds for a successful
habeas corpus action available to the state prisoners. The number
of writs cannot but increase as a result of these holdings.
2
1
18 Justices Black and Douglas have been in the forefront in criticizing this approach
contending that Due Process in the Fourteenth Amendment was a total incorpora-
tion of the first eight Amendments. The highwater mark of this view was Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), where four dissenting justices accepted the
Black-Douglas approach.
"7 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
18 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
19 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 Hall v. Warden, 201 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Md. 1962). This case was overruled
by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.
1963) but the Circuit Court stated that they agreed with the quoted statement.
Since there has been no Supreme Court decision as of January 1965, the question
is still open.
21 Pope, Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applicatlions, 33 F.R.D.




B. Dissolution of Procedural Rules
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the reme-
dies available in the courts of the state, .... "
Prior to 1963 this statute had been given conflicting interpretation
by the lower federal courts. One line of cases had held that the
failure of the applicant to exhaust all the state remedies available
(i.e., the state post conviction appellate proceedings and the exhaus-
tion of all available state proceedings for the hearing of the federal
question when petitioner brings the writ of habeas corpus) was
jurisdictional and that such failure precluded a federal court from
hearing the application." The better reasoned cases indicated that
the federal courts still maintained the power to hear the habeas peti-
tion but that in the interest of federalism they should defer a hear-
ing until the state court had an opportunity to hear the question
unless an extreme factual situation was presented." In 1963, Fay v.
Noid24 presented the question once more to the Supreme Court. The
Court concluded that the requirements of § 2254 were not jurisdic-
tional. It was further held that the habeas petitioner had only to
exhaust the remedies which were available to him at the time of the
habeas application unless there could be gleaned from the state
record a waiver of the right of resort to habeas. The facts of the
case demonstrate the problem dearly. The petitioner, with two other
defendants, had been convicted of second degree murder. The only
evidence against all three was their confessions. It was contended
that these confessions were obtained by coercion. The two co-defend-
ants appealed and their convictions were reversed. They were never
retried and at the time the petition came to the Supreme Court they
were still free. Petitioner had declined to appeal after the conviction
because of the risk of being convicted of first degree murder at a
new trial, with a possible resultant death sentence. The court con-
cluded that this type of Russian roulette could not in any sense of
the word be considered a waiver (a knowing relinquishment of a
right) of the right to resort to habeas.
Noia then went on to discard another procedural restriction. Prior
to Noia, Darr v. Buford"5 had enunciated the rule that in order to
22 Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1952); Hawk v. Jones, 160 F.2d
807 (8th Cir. 1947).
23 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.
1952) ; Marshall v. Snyder, 160 F.2d 351 (2nd Cir. 1947).
24 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
25 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
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exhaust the state remedies that a petition for writ of certiorari must
be filed in the Supreme Court of the United States after approval
of the conviction in the highest state court. Although the petitioner
had complied with this requirement in Noia, the court undertook to
abolish this requirement, noting in the process that the wisdom of
the rule had always been considered doubtful. Thus Noia granted
to state prisoners the right of resort to federal courts with habeas
petitions in every case where the petitioner had both exhausted his
then available state remedies and an intentional refusal to use the
state post conviction procedure could not dearly be gleaned from the
record. Habeas became, in reality then, a post-conviction appeal
without time limitation.
C. Applicability of Res Judicata
Today considerable abuse prevails in the use of the writ and pro-
ceedings pursuant thereto due to the fact that res judicata does not
apply to habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings.2 If res judicata was
held to apply, then a petitioner who had presented a prior petition
on which judgment was rendered concerning the alleged unconsti-
tutional detention by a court of competent jurisdiction would be
barred from again relitigating the issues arising out of the same
cause of action which had been or might have been litigated at the
first hearing." The federal courts have held, however, that in order
to insure the prisoner his constitutional rights res judicata does not
apply. State courts are in accord, absent modifying legislation, but
because of the abuse resulting from such a rule there is a strong
movement for its abandonment." Prior to 1924 there had been no
express holding by the Supreme Court on the question of the appli-
cability of res judicata, although there were decisions which indi-
cated inapplicability to be the rule. 9 In 1924, the Supreme Court,
in Salinger v. Loisel, ° stated that res judicata did not apply to
habeas corpus. The reason for the inapplicability of the doctrine is
26 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11 (a § 2255 proceeding); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 423 (a habeas corpus proceeding).
27 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 63 (1942). Note that if this section were to apply
to a writ of habeas corpus then there would be raised the additional problem of
determining whether the illegal detention as a whole or the particular defect al-
leged in the petition amounts to the cause of action. If the cause of action was
held to be the illegal detention then the petitioner would be precluded from
bringing any more petitions for his detention. If the cause of action was consid-
ered merely the thing alleged in the application then the petitioner would have
the right to subsequent petitions provided they were based on facts different from
those alleged in the prior petition.
28 Rosenfeld, The Application of Res Judicata to Habeas Corpus, Section 7.3(b)
of the Proposed N.Y. Civil Practice Law, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 483 (1961).
29 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 378 (1902); Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S.
652, 658 (1913).
ao 265 U.S. 224 (1924).
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perhaps best stated by the Supreme Court in the recent case of
Sanders v. United States.31
Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where
life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights
is alleged. If 'government ... [is] always [to] be accountable to
the judiciary for man's imprisonment,' access to the courts on
habeas must not be thus impeded. The inapplicability of res judi-
cata to habeas, then, is inherent in the very rule and function of
the writ.
Because res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus, Congress de-
cided it was necessary to provide some means of limiting the number
of petitions. This limitation is set forth in Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244
which provides:
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of
a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States,
or of any state, if it appears that the legality of such detention has
been determined by a judge or court of the United States or a prior
application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the
judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served
by such inquiry.
A similar provision is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which provides:
"The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or
successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner."
The Supreme Court of the United States was called upon in the
Sanders case to determine whether the above quoted portion of §
2255 made the doctrine of res judicata applicable to § 2255 peti-
tions. It was argued that the "similar relief" provisions of the §
2255 provision would allow the summary dismissal of a second or
successive petition. The court held this not to be the case, and con-
strued the section to be substantially the same as §2244 under which
res judicata was held not to apply to habeas petitions."2
The wording of these sections, not being mandatory, allow broad
discretion on the part of the judge in determining whether the peti-
tion is successive, and if so, whether it will further the ends of jus-
tice to hear the application. This broadness insures that a prisoner
will not be deprived of his constitutional rights, even if he has had
a hearing on the same grounds if he substantially (the record not
showing otherwise) alleges new material facts. Thus, what is cre-
ated is a statutory hybrid form of estoppel preventing relitigation
31 373 U.s. 1, 8.
32 Id. at 12-15.
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of the exact issue previously tried unless the ends of justice will be
served thereby.
The strict doctrine of res judicata being inapplicable, a com-
monly encountered problem is abuse of the writ by persons confined
in penal institutions. Such prisoners have been known to submit peti-
tion after petition, apparently solely to relieve the boredom of prison
life."3 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted the
problem in Dorsey v. Gill:h "
[P]etitions for the writ are used not only as they should be to
protect unfortunate persons against miscarriage of justice, but also
as a device for harassing court, custodial and enforcement officers
with a multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for relief. The
most extreme example is that of a person who, between July 1939
and April 1944, presented in the District Court 50 petitions for
writs of habeas corpus; another person has presented 27 petitions,
a third 24, a fourth 20. One hundred nineteen persons have pre-
sented 597 petitions-an average of 5.
Another example is found in the records of petitions filed in the
Northern District of California. During the period from 1937 to
1947, 180 Alcatraz inmates filed 368 petitions, 117 inmates filing
one petition each, the remaining 251 petitions being filed by 63
prisoners." The effect of this practice is to needlessly crowd the
dockets of the federal district courts. 6 It should also be noted that
the majority of these petitions are in forma pauperis and in many
cases virtually unintelligible.
33 Carter, Pre-trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases Under 28 United States Code,
32 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
34 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.D.C. 1945), Cert. denied 375 U.S. 890 (1945).
3 Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1947).
Alcatraz habeas corpus petitions filed from January 1, 1937 to June 15, 1947:
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36 Judge Pope, of the 9th Circuit, when speaking of habeas corpus and § 2255 peti-
tions states: "These petitions furnish the prime example of this sort of thing.
[Frivolous appeals] In my own experience I have considered the necessity of
dealing with the vast majority of these applications which are plainly frivolous,
the most irritating and the most disagreeable task which I have been called upon
to perform as a judge." Pope, supra note 21, at 409.
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IV. PROLIFERATION TOTALLY ACCENTUATED: THE FINAL BLOW
Prior to 1963, although numerous writs were filed in the district
courts because of the developments described in part three of this
note, the problem was not acute because the judges could, in memo-
randum decisions, dismiss the applications."7 This procedure was
severely curtailed by two late cases, Tounsend v. Sai 3 8 and Sanders
vs. United States.9
A prisoner incarcerated in a state prison could always allege such
was done in violation of his constitutional rights and collaterally
attack his conviction by a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts
after he had exhausted his state remedies. Since res judicata did not
apply the federal district court was always at liberty to try the fac-
tual issues anew. The decisive question being when did the situation
require a factual hearing. Justice Frankfurther, in a concurring opin-
ion in Brown v. Allen," undertook to provide guidelines which were
regarded as authoritative for 10 years.41 It was stated that there need
be no evidentiary hearing at the district court unless there appeared
to be some "vital flaw" in the process of ascertaining the facts in the
state court. This guideline proved too elusive for consistent applica-
tion by the district courts.2
In 1963, the question was again posed to itself by the Supreme
Court in Townsend v. Sain. Because of the difficulties which had
occurred after Brown in exercising the federal habeas corpus juris-
37 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443. A fine example of the procedure is Simpson v.
Teets, 239 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1956), wherein the court stated: "How then may
we account for the trial court's action? The recital in the order that the California
court 'has fully and adequately considered all matters presented to it by petitioner'
is just not so, for the petition was denied the same day it was filed .... This is
not the only case in which hearings have been refused upon issues of fact pre-
sented by such petition, or by petition under Title 28 § 2255 .... I cannot help
but think that this situation has some relation to the appalling volume of such
applications which continue to flood the federal courts. In many instances the
petitions have an air of incredibility. It is apparent that even if they were required
to be verified by oath, the pains of perjury would be no deterrent to the filing of
such petitions. The available statistics demonstrate that such skepticism is justi-
fied .... In short, with but rare exceptions, the applications were without merit.
The prisoner who makes such an application has nothing to lose and everything
to gain. The prisoner under sentence of death may gain time; other prisoners, at
the very least, may gain a trip to the federal courtroom. But the filing of con-
trived petitions will not be discouraged by too critical a construction of petitions
with summary denials thereof." See Lorensen, The New Scope of Federal Habeas
Corpus For State Prisoners, 65 W. VIa. L. Rrv. 253 (1963), wherein the author
alludes to the procedure prior to Townsend and Sain as one where the district
courts sloughed off writs of habeas corpus in gross. The district courts were seem-
ingly as anxious as state attorneys to avoid pressing the writ to its fullest scope.
Townsend has now brought an abrupt ending to such procedure.
38 372 U.S. 293.
39 373 U.S. 1.
40 344 U.S. 443.
41 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1 at 181.
42 Id. at 182.
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diction, the Court ignored the judicially self-imposed rule that the
only issue decided should be the particular question before them,
and laid down broad general criteria for the district courts to follow
in granting a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing to determine the
substantive constitutional question involved. The Court held there
must be such a hearing when:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported
by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed
by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hear-
ing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered
evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at
the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and
fair fact hearing.4
3
If there is a substantial allegation in the petition of an alleged
constitutional violation which was not the subject of a full and
adequate hearing in the state courts the federal district court must
now hold evidentiary hearings to determine the question. These cri-
teria make it clear that it is the duty of the federal judiciary to deter-
mine essentially whether the petitioner had a fair adjudication of his
federal claim in the state courts. Such an adjudication includes the
opportunity to be heard fully on the constitutional claim and to have
the ultimate determination thereof supported by the record as a
whole under the perseverance of constitutional principles. If the
record of the state court proceeding fails to satisfy the federal court
that the petitioner did in fact have such a hearing, he is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on his federal habeas claims in the federal
courts."
In Sanders v. United States the question as to when an evidentiary
hearing would be required under § 2255 was presented. The court
went off on a tack similar to Townsend and provided broad guide-
lines for the district courts to follow in granting evidentiary hearings
under § 2255. Section 2255 provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act
of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral
attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.
43 372 U.S. at 313.




A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant
a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings
of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. (Emphasis
added)
45
The Court held that the statute provided the grounds which deter-
mine when an evidentiary hearing was required. If there is a sub-
stantial allegation as to any of the grounds quoted in the first part
of the statute the federal district court must grant an evidentiary
hearing unless the "motion and the files and records" conclusively
show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Sanders also considered the question of successive petitions and
the weight to be given prior adjudications on the question presented.
The Court indicated:
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application
for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same
ground presented in the subsequent application was determined
adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior
determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice
would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent
application.
48
Needless to say the provisions of Townsend and Sanders have
produced a rash of evidentiary hearings in the federal district courts
and now that these holdings are being combined with the expanded
substantive base for habeas petitions the district courts are literally
being swamped with petitions.4" How may the congestion caused by
these rules be eased without violating the rights of those persons
whose petitions have real merit and should be heard?
V. SOLUTIONS
Since the problem has two aspects, that is, divided into (A) nu-
merous original writs and (B) numerous successive writs by a single
prisoner, the solution phase will suggest an approach to each area.
45 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948).
46 373 U.S. 1 at 15.
47 "There has been a tremendous increase in the number of petitions for habeas
corpus filed in the federal courts in recent years, most of them unmeritorious,
repetitious, or even frivolous, and this flood of petitions threatens to clog the
wheels of these courts and to interfere with the efficient discharge of their work."
Bodenheimer, Symposium-Federal Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. REV. 38 (1964).
See Gold, Federal Habeas For State Prisoner-A New Look, 25 OHIO ST. L.J.
60, 68 (1964); Desmond, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Con-
victions-Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L.R. 18 (1964).
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A. Numerous Original Writs
The federal district courts are under no requirement to grant a
mandatory evidentiary hearing where the record in the state hearing
conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. As was
statd in Townsend:
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas must
hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive
a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the state court, either at the
time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In other words a
federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier
of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts.48
As can be seen, if the state court reliably found on the issue the
district court is under no duty to rehear the question. Generally
where the state court does not give an adequate evidentiary hearing
on the federal question it does so for one of two reasons: (1) The
state procedure for hearing the federal question is not adequate " or
(2) the natural and understandable reticence of state judges to
reopen the question after the conviction and after the appellate pro-
48 372 U.S. at 312.
49 "Postconviction remedies in the state courts may not be available; they may be
unduly narrow. Even if a postconviction remedy is available in the state courts
through state habeas corpus or coram nobis and it is adequate to reach the kind
of error which the Supreme Court regards as fundamentally constitutional, the
record is frequently quite unclear." Freund, Symposium-Federal Habeas Corpus,
9 UTAH L. REV. 27 (1964). One procedure utilized to avoid hearing the federal
question on its merits is the application of the doctrine of res judicata to a sub-
sequent petition. As discussed previously the great weight of authority both in
England and the United States refuses to apply res judicata to habeas petitions.
Statutes modifying such a rule vary. Some apply the doctrine, while others deny
it on the basis of a prior hearing; still others forbid subsequent application to
judges of inferior jurisdictions after a previous application has been denied by a
higher court. Rosenfeld, supra note 28 at 484.
Under California law the writ of habeas corpus will issue where any prisoner
is "unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty." CAl.. PEN. CODE § 1473.
Generally it may be stated that the California writ may issue anytime a person is
held in violation of his constitutional rights. Wrrra, CRIMINAL PRocEDu 771
(1963). But the California courts have hedged the writ's issuance with procedural
rules. (1) The petitioner must always seek the writ in a lower court first before
an appellate court will issue the writ. (2) An appellate court will usually deny
the writ where petitioner has failed to make a motion or otherwise raise his point
in the trial court. (3) The writ may be denied where a remedy by appeal or
otherwise was available and was not employed. (4) Also the problem of succes-
sive writs is handled by CAL. PEN. CODE § 1475 precluding the same court from
issuing a writ which had done so previously whether or not the exact issue was
raised. The petitioner must bring the petition in the next higher court. See gen-
erally WrrKIN, op. cit. supra at 767-71. At any rate these procedural provisions
allow the California judges ample opportunity to refuse to hear a federal question
on the merits. See TEx. CRIM. Pao. § 135 (allowing state judge to refuse appli-
cation if record shows it to be without merit) ; Cochran v. Kruger, 194 Pa. Super.
564, 169 A.2d 886 (1961); Moore v. Burnett, 109 S.E.2d 605 (Geo. 1959).
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ceedings have been exhausted,"0 in spite of the fact that state judi-
ciaries look on the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction with a certain
amount of animosity. There is an affront to state sensibilities when
a single federal judge can order discharge of a prisoner whose con-
viction has been affirmed by all the appellate machinery of a given
state."'
It would appear that the solution might come from the states
themselves or from Congress. Congress could, under the Supremacy
Clause of the constitution,52 pass legislation which would require the
state courts to give evidentiary factual hearings on constitutional
questions to the same extent that the federal courts are required to
do such under § 2255 and habeas petitions. But this proffered solu-
tion would in all likelihood be looked upon by the states as unjusti-
fied federal "interference." The animosity over the federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction would remain, but such a solution would require
a hearing and the creation of a record on which the federal district
court could base its ruling on the habeas petition. It is submitted
that such a solution would do little to overcome the natural reticence
of state court judges to reopen such questions. Any such statute
which is, so to speak, "crammed down the throats" of the states
would seemingly not be applied by state judges in the spirit without
which it could properly be expected to obtain the desired result. In
spite of its undesirability this solution is likely to follow, unless the
states solve the problem themselves.
The federal habeas jurisdiction would be unnecessary in the vast
majority of cases if the state courts granted a full and fair eviden-
tiary hearing on the federal questions posed by habeas petitions. In
those states where legislation is not broad enough to allow habeas
corpus or similar relief to the same extent as § 2255, statutes should
be passed allowing such. In those states where the legislation is
broad enough but because of judicially engrafted procedural rules,
50 "ENlot all the (state] courts are . manned by persons who really place a very
high value on seeing that justice is done in each individual case. Some people
who are persuaded of the high social value of timely and expeditious law ad-
ministration are willing to allow a little human wastage to be involved in the
process. This is a question of values. The American Constitution is not against
law enforcement, but it has placed a higher value on being sure that the indi-
vidual is fairly treated. . . .I think it fair to say that many judges-a great many
of whom, incidentally, have been drawn to the bench after careers as prosecuting
officers-have a somewhat different equation in their minds and may therefore
not be quite so penetrating in their study of individual cases as they should be.
Freund, supra note 49 at 33. United States ex rel. Walker v. La Vallee, 224 F.
Supp. 661, 663 (N.D. N.Y. 1963), "The reluctance of New York trial and
appellate courts to review old situations is apparently unchanged."
51 Wright, op. cit. supra note 1 at 185; Federal Habeas Corpus Treatments of State
Fact Findings: A Suggested Approach, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1253. 1254 (1963).
52 See generally 16 Am. JUL §§ 50-58 (2 ed. 1964).
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by which a case may be refused a hearing, or because of the state
judges' reticence to hear the question, full hearings are not given,
the court created procedural rules should be discarded and the reluc-
tance of state judiciaries to grant evidentiary hearings dissipated.
The state determination would in the vast mass of habeas litigation
be the final determination because the federal judiciary has no great
fondness for the duty imposed on them by Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 2241-
55." Also under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 the petitioner must exhaust his
state remedies before filing his petition in the federal courts. The
federal judge could then look at the record of the hearing in the
state court and determine from it that the petitioner is conclusively
not entitled to relief. Thus it would be encumbent on the state judi-
ciaries to explain carefully what was done and what was consid-
ered.54 This procedure would insure that justifiable state sensitivities
would not be encroached and yet the merits of the contention would
be tried and a determination made in such a manner so as not to
deprive the prisoner of his fundamental privilege of resort to the
courts. It would seem that this solution would dispel a great deal of
the friction between the federal and state judiciaries. Normally the
most sensitive state officials are those who are continually arguing
for state's rights. This procedure would seek to uphold the jurisdic-
tional prerogative of the state courts and yet maintain an ultimate
federal check for that rare state proceeding which is fundamentally
lawless."
B. Numerous Successive Writs
Since the writ of habeas corpus is most often used by prisoners to
challenge some constitutional aspect of the criminal case in which
they were convicted, it is often erroneously assumed that the habeas
corpus proceeding is criminal in nature, i.e., part of the appellate
procedure following the criminal conviction. The writ of habeas
corpus is, however, available to free a person from illegal restraint
53 Supra note 36.
54 Freund, supra note 49, at 34.
55 Judge Desmond of New York has proposed as a solution to the problem that
Congress pass legislation taking the habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners
away from the federal district court with the one ultimate check being the Su-
preme Court of the United States through the certiorari power. Judge Desmond
proposes that Congress then pass detailed legislation, under the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, which would in detail provide when the state courts should
hear due process claims. Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus: How Two
Parallel Judicial Lines Meet, 49 A.B.A.iJ. 1166 (1963). This solution seems un-
workable because the Supreme Court could not effectively oversee the project with
its certiorari power due to the sheer number of cases. This criticism assumes that
there is a need for the federal courts to oversee the state courts, a point not con-
ceded by Judge Desmond. Furthermore Judge Desmond's solution presupposes
that Congress could provide a detailed "due process" standard. It is submitted
that the constitutional elasticity of the phrase would make this impossible.
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of any kind,s" and is a collateral attack on the judgment, challenging
the fairness of the procedure or the jurisdiction of the court.
A criminal proceeding is defined as:
One instituted for the purpose either of preventing the com-
mission of a crime or for fixing the guilt of a crime already com-
mitted and punishing the offender; as distinguished from a 'civil'
proceeding, which is for the redress of a private injury.57 (Empha-
sis added.)
Under this definition, the official to whom the writ is directed is not
the offender, and an action of habeas corpus is not one designed to
punish such official. Rather, the purpose of the writ is to gain the
freedom of a prisoner who is held in violation of his constitutional
rights,5 8 and is the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement
of the civil right to personal liberty.59 Therefore, although the peti-
tion for the writ of habeas corpus is used most often to gain release
from a criminal conviction it is not part of the criminal proceeding.
As early as 1883 the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Tom
Tong" declared:
Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings, and pro-
ceedings for the punishment of crimes are criminal proceedings.
In the present case the petitioner is held under criminal process.
The prosecution against him is a criminal prosecution but the writ
of habeas corpus which he has obtained is not a proceeding in that
prosecution. On the contrary it is a new suit brought by him to
enforce a civil right, which he claims, as against those who are
holding him in custody, under the criminal process. Such a pro-
ceeding on his part is, in our opinion, a civil proceeding, notwith-
standing his object is, by means of it to get released from custody
under a criminal prosecution.
This was the first of a long line of cases so to hold.6
It is submitted that since habeas corpus proceedings are civil in
nature the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply and a thorough
use of the Rules would alleviate a great portion of the problem
56 Nebraska Children's Home Soc. v. State, 57 Neb. 765, 78 N.W. 267.
57 BLAcK, LAW DIcTioNARY (4th ed. 1951).
58 KINUANn, ANGLO Ami tIcAN LAw (2d ed. 1952).
59 Dancy v. Owens, 126 Old. 138, 258 Pac. 879 (1927).
60 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).
61 Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 U.S. 104 (1889); Gross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82
(1892) ; Estep v. United States, 251 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Dancy v. Owens,
126 Old. 138, 258 Pac. 879. One such holding is that habeas corpus proceedings
being civil in nature carries with it no right to counsel as would a criminal pro-
ceeding. Graeber v. Schneckloth, 241 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1957); United States
ex. rel. Sholter v. Claudy, 203 P.2d 805 (3rd Cir. 1953); Collins v. Heinze, 217
F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1954) cert. denied 349 U.S. 940 (1955); Application of
Atchley, 169 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Cal. 1958). But see recent suggestion that
denial of counsel in habeas petition would be a denial of due process. Gold, supra
note 49 at 65.
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created by a single prisoner filing successive petitions for writs of
habeas corpus or motions pursuant to § 2255. The idea of using the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas corpus and § 2255 pro-
ceedings is not novel. The Rules, it is submitted, are merely not
being utilized to their full extent.
In Schiebelhut v. United States,62 the United States Attorney pro-
pounded interrogatories to the petitioner who refused to answer
except in open court under guidance of counsel. The court stated:
The appellant cannot raise the question as to whether the inter-
rogatories were properly submitted. This court has previously ruled
that Section 2255 Title 28, U.S.C., is a civil action and as such is
subject to Rules 33 and 37 (d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Similarly, in Estep v. United States," the court applied Rule 45 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to a § 2255 petition, holding
that there was no limit on the number of witnesses that could be
subpoenaed to appear at the proceeding. Also, in Bowdidge v. Leh-
man, 5 the court held that the summary dismissal of a § 2255
petition was governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.6 It is therefore submitted that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure govern habeas and § 2255 proceedings.
The only case found which is not in accord with this view is
Sullivan v. United States67 wherein the court stated:
Just because some decisions referred to Sec. 2255 as a civil pro-
ceeding does not prevent further inquiry. To us the loose use of
the phrase civil proceeding is an excellent illustration of the extent
to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. If this really was
a civil proceeding we would suppose that all of the civil rules
would be applicable including the rules encompassing the govern-
ment's formal pre-trials, and the right to a jury, ad infinitum.
This conclusion is clearly in error. Proceedings to enforce civil
rights are civil proceedings and proceedings for the punishment of
crimes are criminal proceedings. The fact that the remedy is extraor-
dinary is immaterial to the classification." ' The court in the Sullivan
case was concerned with "flagrant abuses" of § 2255 as evidenced
by the frivolous petitions inspired by "jailhouse lawyers." These
62 318 F.2d 785 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 973 (1960).
63 Id. at 786.
64 251 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1958).
65 252 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1959).
66 28 U.S.C. Rule 56(b) (1948): "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
crossclaim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any parts thereof."
67 198 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
68 Dancy v. Owens, 127 Okl. 138, 258 Pac. 879; Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556.
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abuses are the ones which may be most readily controlled by the
appropriate use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However,
the court overlooked the possibility of limiting these abuses through
the use of the Rules. Furthermore the Rules themselves provide that
they are applicable in habeas corpus appeals and to habeas hearings
to the extent not elsewhere covered in the United States Code.69
An examination of Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 through 2255 reveals
that the only code section dealing substantially with civil discovery
procedures is § 2246. The section provides:
On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken
orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by
affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the right to
propound written interrogatories to the afflants, or to file answer-
ing affidavits.
Cases interpreting § 2246 generally have been liberal and hold
that the granting or refusal to grant motions to allow the taking of
depositions or the serving of interrogatories is entirely discretionary
with the court.1
In Hunter vs. Thomas"' it was contended that Rule 81 (a) (2)2
excluded the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in habeas
corpus proceedings. The court held the Rules applicable to the ex-
tent not superseded by the United States Code and that there were
no procedural provisions in the Code with respect to a new trial in
habeas corpus proceedings, and since habeas corpus was a civil pro-
ceeding the provisions of Rule 59 therefore governed motions for a
new trial. Thus the court concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applied to habeas corpus proceedings in situations other
than on appeal.
With the Rules applicable, 3 the solution to the problem of suc-
cessive petitions would be to insure that each and every point which
69 28 U.S.C. Rule 81. (a) (2) (1948): "In the following proceedings appeals are
governed by these rules, but they are not applicable otherwise than on appeal
except to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in stat-
utes of the United States and as heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at
law or suits in equity; . . .habeas corpus .... The requirements of Title 28
U.S.C., Section 2253, relating to certification of probable cause in certain appeals
in habeas corpus cases remain in force. (Emphasis added.)
70 Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1956), vacated on other grounds in
354 U.S. 156;- Loper v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1959). Cf Sullivan v.
United States, 198 F. Supp. 624 (1961).
71 173 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1949).
72 Supra, note 69.
73 An apparent application of rule 8 (a) can be seen in the case of ManGaoang v.
Boyd, 186 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1950), wherein the court held that undenied alle-
gations in a petition for habeas corpus are taken as true. Accord United States
ex rel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 12 (3rd Cir. 1961), where the court applied
Rule 60 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the correction of a
transcription error on appeal.
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might constitute grounds for relief under either a habeas corpus or
§ 2255 petition is ruled upon in the first hearing. Through the use
of depositions, requests for admission, interrogatories, affidavits and
pre-trial, this solution is attainable. When an original petition is
filed with the federal district court, the United States Attorney
should determine by interrogatories or depositions, if the petition
has any basis for relief with respect to each and every ground for
which a hearing is required. This determination should be made in
each and every case, whether or not the grounds are raised by the
petitioner. A pre-trial hearing should be held and through the use
of the discovery devices of the Rules a pre-trial order should be
made containing all the actual contentions of the petitioner and
listing as issues all grounds which through the discovery devices
were ascertained to be possible grounds for relief under habeas cor-
pus. The court should conduct a full hearing on these issues making
findings of fact on all the issues raised, and on those issues where
no proof is offered making findings of fact pursuant to rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 52 provides:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advi-
sory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pur-
suant to Rule 58.
Under the provisions of Rule 56 the depositions, interrogatories,
pre-trial order and findings could all be entered in a motion for
summary judgment in case of a subsequent petition. This procedure
would thus save the time and expense of a second full hearing, for
no federal judge need entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus if the legality of such detention has been fully determined
and the judge is satisfied that the ends of justice will not be sub-
verted by a refusal to have a hearing on the question."4 The Supreme
Court of the United States in the Sanders case apparently alludes to
the possibility.
The imaginative handling of a prisoner's first motion would in
general do much to anticipate and avoid the problem of a hearing
on a second or successive motion. The judge is not required to
74 "Judge James Carter of the Southern District of California has put into effect a
pre-trial rule operable as to Section 2255 applications. When the Judge deter-
mines that a hearing is necessary he appoints a lawyer for the prisoner and sends
out a pre-trial notice listing all of the reasonable available grounds for collateral
attack. A pre-trial hearing is held and on the basis of the hearing detailed find-
ings of fact are made, finding pro or con on the issues presented and on which
proof was offered and foreclosing further inquiry as to those on which no proofwas offered. The utility of this approach is that it gives full use to pre-trial dis-
covery methods including interrogatories addressed to the prisoner and requestsf r admission." Breinte stei , Remarks on Recent Post Conv ction Decisions, 33
0 .R.D. 363, 444 (1963). See also 32 F.R.D. 393 for the pre-trial stipulation and
order; 32 F.R.D. 402 for Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and judgment.
[Vol. 2
NOTES
limit his decision on the first motion to the grounds narrowly
alleged. . . . He is free to adopt any appropriate means for in-
quiry into the legality of the prisoner's detention in order to ascer-
tain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim to
be entitled to relief.7 5
V. CONCLUSION
In this day of literate prisoners there has, perhaps, been found
within the doctrine of habeas corpus the seeds of its own destruc-
tion. If some methods cannot be found to curb the abuses to which
the writ of habeas corpus has been put, corrective legislation might
well follow, so restrictive as to nullify the writ's primary purpose
which is to keep government accountable to the judiciary for man's
imprisonment. The proposed solutions to the problems here pre-
sented would work in a manner so as not to deprive any person of
his fundamental right to habeas corpus. They would also dispose of
habeas and § 2255 petitions in the sound discretion of the court, and
consequently would save the time and expense of another full evi-
dentiary hearing in the federal courts.
David Pitkin
Ray Shollenbarger
75 373 U.S. 1, 22.
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